Another try on “The Pluralist’s Guide to Philosophy”

Linda Alcoff is having trouble with the Typepad interface, so she has asked me to post the following on her behalf:

Once again I want to thank those who have offered their considered reflections and heartfelt thoughts on the Pluralist’s Guide, and the general issues of inclusivity. The level of information sharing and publicly stated commitments to inclusiveness that the Guide has induced are, surely all must agree, a good thing.

I will restate some of our responses to criticisms below; it has been dismaying to see repeated claims that we have not responded to criticisms when in fact most of the information some are demanding is on the Pluralist Guide site itself and other responses have been posted on this site.

But first, let us be clear on the situation of our profession. There has been a generation of brain drain in philosophy. Continental philosophers go into English and Religion and Comparative Literature departments; critical race philosophers go into Ethnic Studies Programs or law schools; LGBT folks go into English or LGBT programs; American philosophers go into Political Science departments; feminists go into Education and Women’s studies. Some of the best and brightest choose between a career facing constant battles within philosophy, or fame and fortune (relatively speaking) outside philosophy, and make rational choices. We are committed to making philosophy more hospitable to philosophical diversity, and thus to combat brain drain. Otherwise, as folks at the Collegium of Black Women Philosophers put it, why would you encourage students to put themselves into this kind of alienated, embattled environment?

Now let me restate and amplify some points made earlier about the methodological debates, especially concerning climate studies:

1) Methodologies of climate studies are intrinsically difficult, without a doubt. Taking a majority vote of the target group within a department does not guarantee accuracy, as many have pointed out. It is vital to consult those who have left a department, but often difficult to track them down.  Actual climate conditions can vary significantly from person to person, depending, for example, if the person’s area of interest requires them to study with a given individual who is problematic. Identities are complex objects, and the specific mediations of gender identity, for example, such as race, sexuality, disability, and class, can create significant differences in experience.

2) Methodologies of climate studies have been usefully debated. In other words, reasonable people disagree. Rather than impugning dishonest motives or devious goals, differences over methodological issues might be approached as we approach our other (constant) epistemological disagreements.

3) However, many of us who have been involved in climate studies over the years have noticed a pattern of deflection from the content of the study to the methodology of the study. Quick dismissals, demands to know who exactly said what exactly about whom exactly, and personal attacks on the authors of the study are such a common occurrence that this phenomena bears study itself!  

4) The question then is, should climate studies be engaged in at all, given these sorts of inevitable debates, intrinsic problems, and vulnerability to deflection from what should be the real concern? Again, reasonable people answer this question differently. On the yes side, it can be argued that some climate studies have galvanized policy change and a shift in the culture of a workplace. Despite flaws, they can get people talking in ways they did not before. They can be done responsibly to provide useful even if imperfect information. They can be approached as a starting point. They can help people to begin to realize that there may be things that they did not know that they did not know.

This discussion of climate studies needs to be put squarely in a real, non-ideal world context. Actual steps taken should be responsive to actual conditions, and likely effects, rather than based on an idealized approaches. Consider this in light of the demand for ‘evidence’ about the basis of a negative judgment of climate: in my experience, a search for evidence can be motivated by a desire to establish that there is one isolated bad apple, or that the charges are bogus for one reason or another, or to find out who was the whistleblower so that that person can be harassed. In other words, it can be motivated by a desire to avoid making  changes. So it is very important to do any evidence gathering in a way that will not end up adversely affecting whistleblowers. Perhaps the best thing for departments to do would be to forego the evidence gathering and develop some pro-active actions. What these might be may include changing hiring priorities, addressing gender and pluralism issues in pro-seminars, having some recent work in social psychology made available to the whole department in some effective way (Claude Steele’s research is great), and so on.
 
We have to be honest about the fact that the process of criticism and debate within philosophy can be distorted or overdetermined by professional competitiveness, individual psychological dynamics, and plain racism, sexism, etc. Yet somehow we have to remain open to criticism, and engaged with debates in a constructive way. We at the Pluralist’s Guide will remain open to suggestions, critiques, and offers of help! And we will continue to try to improve our Guide.

Linda Martín Alcoff
Department of Philosophy

Hunter College/CUNY

Comments

[GP]

YAG, here is one thing on which we can surely agree: this *is* exasperating. I do think we are talking past one another, so I will give it one more try.

I think the analogy to child molestation that you make is faulty for a number of reasons. First, I am a human being and Princeton, Rutgers, & NYU are programs. Also, I don't have the kind of resources these programs have. And I don't live in a society where female philosophy profs are known to molest children and get away with it.

But for sake of argument let's say I live in that imaginary society where I have a lot of power and female philosophy professors are known to molest children, plus there is a history of them getting away with it for various reasons (institutions and historical practices). Let's say also that a group of very intelligent people who care a lot about children (hmmm... while I am willing to humor casting myself as a molester--I really don't like casting women as children, so please take note of that). Okay, let's say that group of intelligent people who are known to care deeply about this issue comes out and says: we have good reason to believe that three female profs are serious child molesters and my name is one of them. As a human being who cares deeply about this issue (and as it happens in the real world I do)--but continuing on in our imaginary world it seems to me that any decent female prof *would* care about this issue, so in imaginary world where I am wrongly accused and I am just a regular decent human being, here is how I hope I would respond. First, I would be concerned about what I may have done to give this terrible impression to people. This may seem outrageous to you: I'm being accused! why wouldn't I be downright pissed? But consider the context--I have a lot of power, there *is* a serious problem in my profession with this issue, and it has a history. Plus, this group really does care about the issue and they are in all other ways pretty well informed human beings as far as I can tell. At the very least I can assume that people have been going around saying things about me to the very people I care about. Since 1.the issue is pretty fraught, 2. I do have a lot of power and 3. I do think this issue is rather more important than my reputation (after all I am fairly protected--female profs get away with these kinds of things and no one bats an eye, I am a very well respected prof, many people will take my classes and continue to think I am pretty incredible no matter what is said about me, etc.), I would think it would be more important for me to get the word out about who I really am than to tell this group to take down their website. And if there were concrete things I could do to change the situation as a whole and to publicize that work widely, I really think that would be so much more important than my protected reputation.

The analogy still fails in a lot of ways. There's the issue of stigma--and face it, being a jerk to women just doesn't carry that kind of stigma, so it's hard to imagine all the things into my imaginary scenario when molestation does. Plus, I am a person, not a department.

Okay, so why don't I use the Amnesty analogy? Well, for one, I don't think Rutgers is Belgium. Nor do I think Oregon or DePaul is Saudia Arabia. Temporality really matters and the histories just don't line up. But maybe you were thinking some other department is Saudia Arabia? If it is, I'd let Alcoff know, providing some context and historical background--granted, you are just one person, and I trust Alcoff to check on these things with more than one person (I know, you don't, but I do: I think the evidence of her work (philosophical and practical) far outweighs any of the criticisms she has come under for the climate list).

One last thought and then I have to go. (I really do have to bow out of this conversation to tend to work, family obligations, etc--I suspect you may as well, so if you want to have the last word, go for it.) I suspect that those who disagree with you on the climate survey may be aghast that I even took up the molestation analogy. Why do you suppose that is? Is it just because they are incredibly stupid? Incredibly stubborn? So totally wrong that they cannot stand up to your arguments? I think when reasonable people can't or do not feel the force of one another's arguments there is usually another answer. (And, yes, I think it is reasonable to think that Alcoff & Rooney, and all the members of the boards are reasonable--I have no grounds to doubt that given the history of their work, both philosophical and practical...)

[Rebecca Kukla]

Anon grad @1:19 - I am really super unwilling to concede 'the left' in that way. As someone who had it explained to me by my dad when I was 6 that being Jewish meant being a Marxist and an Atheist, whose parents led Vietnam war protests, and who has spent a big chunk of my adult life working for reproductive rights and GLBTQ causes as well as other 'leftist' causes, I really get sad when being on 'the left' gets reduced to occupying a little sectarian corner of theoretical space.

No issue with the rest of your post though :)

[Rebecca Kukla]

Sorry, Anon grad @1:29

[Anonymous Grad Student (from an earlier thread)]

GP – Perhaps this will prove helpful. The question, it seems to me, is not whether it is reasonable to think that Alcoff, Rooney, and the rest of the members of the Advisor Board are reasonable. Rather, the question is whether it is reasonable to think that the means by which they are pursuing admirable goals are ethical.

Your post (like Alcoff’s) appears to assume that the larger profession ought to extend a particular kind of trust to the PG climate guide and its authors. I submit that the kind of trust expected is not appropriate to a professional context. Rather, it’s the kind of trust that comes with personal acquaintance, and which is most typically appropriate in personal contexts. Perhaps (?) that, in a nutshell, is the problem. No one has the right to expect – much less implicitly demand – a personal level of trust in a professional context (let alone one where legitimate questions and concerns are going unanswered and unacknowledged!). And yet, in the case of the PG climate guide, that is precisely what's being expected.

(Nb: I agree that women are typically extended less epistemic trust than they ought to be. I take this issue to be entirely orthogonal to the ethics of trust in this context. Should I be wrong, I hope someone will correct me.)

[Yet another anonymous grad (again)]

GP, I appreciate the time you've taken to reply to my comment, but I'm afraid I can only agree with you on this: that we are (still) talking past each other.

Any two things that are numerically distinct are unalike in a vast number of different respects, so it's easy to attack analogies by pointing out differences. What's at issue is, of course, which features of the cases being compared are relevant to the analogy being made, and why. I'm not going to get into the game of debating thought experiment scenarios on this thread. I gave you a couple of thought experiments. You weren't persuaded. That's life.

I think "Anonymous Grad Student (from an earlier thread)" has correctly identified a more central point of contention, which is that you seem to think that philosophers who have never met Alcoff et al. are under an obligation to extend them epistemic trust on the climate issue. I extend epistemic trust to experts -- I trust climate scientists on global warming, leading philosophers of language on who's doing good work in philosophy of language, and so on and so forth. But I do not believe that Alcoff et al. have any expertise on, say, the climate for women at Rutgers. In fact, I'd hazard a guess that I know more about the climate for women at Rutgers, because I know quite a few people, female and male, who are current graduate students and faculty members there. I would also guess that I know more than they do about the climate for women at one of the departments "Strongly Recommended" by the PG, because I was a graduate student there. Usually the experts on the climate are the people who are in it.